Probabilistic causality: a rejoinder to Ellery Eells by Dupré, John
Philosophy of Science Association
Probabilistic Causality: A Rejoinder to Ellery Eells
Author(s): John Dupre
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 690-698
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187770
Accessed: 22/01/2009 07:09
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Philosophy of Science Association and The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.
http://www.jstor.org
DISCUSSION: 
PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY: 
A REJOINDER TO ELLERY EELLS* 
JOHN DUPRE 
Department of Philosophy 
Stanford University 
In an earlier paper (Dupre 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by 
theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise 
the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background 
conditions (the "contextual unanimity thesis"). I also suggested that a more 
promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statis- 
tical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual 
unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own 
to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections 
to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion. 
In a recent paper, Ellery Eells defends a thesis commonly held by the- 
orists of probabilistic causality against some objections of mine.' The 
thesis in question is that to be a (probabilistic) cause a factor must in- 
crease-or at least not decrease-the probability of its effect in every 
possible set of background circumstances. Hereafter I shall refer to this 
as the contextual unanimity thesis (or more simply, "the unanimity the- 
sis"). Eells also objects to some positive suggestions I made in my (1984). 
Here I would like to reply to some of these objections. 
Eells directs at least three main criticisms at my views. First, he charges 
that my objections to the unanimity thesis depend on the failure to ap- 
preciate that probabilistic laws are a relation among three things: a causal 
factor, a probabilistic effect, and a particular population; not just between 
the first two of these. Second, I made the suggestion in my earlier paper 
that probabilistic causality would be better explicated in terms of a notion 
of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Eells objects to my appeal to the 
notion of a fair sample that it is insufficiently explicated (which I admit), 
and that in so far as it can be explicated, it leads to paradoxical and 
unacceptable results. And third, he suggests that my positive suggestions 
are relevant not to the explication of probabilistic causality at all, but 
*Received May 1988: revised August 1988. 
'I refer to Eells (1987), commenting on Duprd (1984), which is in part a reply to Eells 
and Sober (1983). For further references see any of the above. All references to Eells in 
the text are to Eells (1987). 
Philosophy of Science, 57 (1990) pp. 690-698. 
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rather, if at all, to the problem of inference to causal hypotheses; or in 
other words, the concerns that I address are methodological rather than 
metaphysical.2 Hence, presumably, my arguments are at cross purposes 
to the theorists I intend to address. In this reply I shall say something 
about each of these points. 
It will help to begin by reviewing very briefly one of my previous 
objections to the unanimity thesis, the observation that it has some ap- 
parently very unintuitive consequences. Suppose that, on average, smok- 
ing raises your probability of developing lung cancer by a factor of 12. 
I say "on average" because exactly how smoking will affect an individ- 
ual's chances of becoming ill will no doubt depend on many things: how 
much you smoke, how you smoke, and no doubt many peculiar features 
of your physiology and environment. If such were the case, it would seem 
correct to say that smoking caused lung cancer. Yet these circumstances 
would be quite consistent with the possibility that there should be some 
small minority of the population with a physical constitution such that 
smoking actually reduced their chance of developing lung cancer. In this 
situation, the unanimity theory implies that the statement "smoking causes 
lung cancer" is strictly speaking false, since the effect is non-unanimous. 
Moreover since we do not have, and from a practical point of view prob- 
ably never could have, evidence to exclude the existence of such a for- 
tunate minority, it appears that we really have no reason to believe that 
smoking causes lung cancer. The apologists for the tobacco industry have 
been vindicated by philosophy. 
Eells replies, plausibly enough, that my example ignores the necessary 
relativization of probabilistic causal claims to particular populations. In 
the example above we need only say that in the population of individuals 
with the relevant physiological anomaly, smoking prevents cancer, for 
the rest, it causes cancer.3 For the total population, according to Eells, 
smoking is a "mixed" factor, which is to say that it is neither positive 
2As Eells points out, my discussion of samples, rather than subpopulations, may have 
invited this misinterpretation. Nevertheless, samples are the appropriate entities for my 
purposes. The point of a fair sample is that it correctly (or closely) corresponds to the 
distribution of causal factors in the entire population. Since I conceive of causes as factors 
which, averaging over interactions with other factors, have a positive tendency to produce 
a particular effect, if a cause operates in the population, it will do so in a fair sample, 
even if, pace Eells, it does not so act in some subpopulations. That my appeal to samples 
suggests a convergence between methodology and metaphysics, I take to be a virtue of 
my approach. 
3The situation described constitutes what Eells refers to as causal interaction, which he 
has discussed elsewhere in some detail (Eells 1986). The only modification that he pro- 
poses to the contextual unanimity theory to accommodate such cases is that interacting 
factors must be held fixed even if they are themselves neither causes nor preventatives of 
the effect under consideration. This assures the possibility of the response discussed and 
criticized in the present paper. 
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nor negative for cancer. It is, I suppose, something of an embarrassment 
to this reply that it entails that we never, or virtually never, know what 
the population is to which our causal claims apply; part of the motivation 
for my objection was the thought that it would be nice if we could make 
causal claims about antecedently identifiable populations. The unanimity 
thesis, on the contrary, entails that we cannot know the population to 
which a causal generalization applies until we have identified all the causal 
factors relevant to the production of the effect we are investigating. This 
seems to me an unduly cautious position. 
However, rather than pursue these difficulties immediately, what I would 
like to emphasize at the outset is that my example was intended not solely 
to embarrass the unanimity theory, but rather to point to what strikes me 
as a major difficulty with the entire metaphysical picture that underlies 
that theory. In particular, what seems deeply questionable about the una- 
nimity theory is the implicit assumption that there is some determinate 
set of factors, any maximal set of which will have a univocal tendency 
to produce or prevent an effect in which we are interested. This assump- 
tion is an essential part of what I characterized (in Dupre 1984) as covert 
determinism. This, at any rate, is my most fundamental disagreement 
with the theory. At the end of this paper I shall return briefly to this point. 
I shall also have more to say below on the question of how probabilistic 
causal claims should be relativized to populations. (Eells's views on this 
topic are discussed in greater detail in Dupre and Cartwright (1988).) I 
might, however, emphasize here that my own position certainly is com- 
mitted to such relativization though, as indicated above, relativization to 
rather different, and more readily identifiable, populations. But for now 
I shall turn to Eells's comments on the (admittedly sketchy) positive pro- 
posal I offered in my earlier paper, and Eells's objections to my appeal 
to "fair samples". 
I certainly did not attempt anything like a complete explanation of the 
notion of a fair sample. In part this was because, in theory at least, I take 
the idea to be quite unproblematic: a fair sample is a sample that accu- 
rately represents the distribution of (relevant) properties in the population 
from which it is drawn; a biased sample fails in this regard. The simplest 
use of samples is just to measure such distributions, as of smokers in the 
U.S. or red balls in an urn. A more interesting case is their use in con- 
trolled experiments. In the first case the only problem in determining the 
fairness of the sample (apart from obvious questions about chance) is that 
of ensuring the causal independence of the method of selection and the 
property under investigation. In the second case there is also a problem 
about the causal independence of the effect being investigated and the 
method by which the cause is introduced. It does seem to me that while 
these problems are far from negligible, they are finite and generally tract- 
able. 
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If one really wants to know whether smoking causes lung cancer, one 
should take large samples of infants, (randomly selected from the pop- 
ulation, so there is good reason to believe that one has a fair sample) 
divide them into two equal groups, and force one group to smoke for the 
rest of their-no doubt abbreviated-lives. (See Giere 1984, p. 284). 
The cases that have been mainly debated by myself, Eells and others are 
precisely those in which such an approach is contingently unavailable (in 
the present case, for obvious ethical reasons). Part of my motive for thinking 
that even in these cases the notion of a fair sample would be analytically 
useful was the thought that a controlled experiment provides the paradigm 
case of having good evidence for the existence of a probabilistic causal 
relation. Of course, it is not trivial to apply this notion to cases where 
we are dealing with naturally occurring causes in uncontrolled popula- 
tions, and I admit that I did not provide any sort of account in my earlier 
paper of how this should be done. However, Eells himself has carried 
out this task to my satisfaction if not to his, and I am indebted to him 
for doing so. His elaboration of my suggestion is as follows (p. 110). 
We select samples of smokers and nonsmokers from the general popu- 
lation in such a way that other known causal influences on the effect 
under investigation, in this case the occurrence of heart attacks, occur in 
these samples with the frequency with which they occur in the general 
population.4 We conclude that smoking (probabilistically) causes heart 
attacks just in case the frequency of heart attacks is higher in the sample 
of smokers than in the sample of nonsmokers. The underlying rationale, 
of course, is the same as that for a controlled experiment: we aim to 
compare samples in which other causes occur with equal frequency- 
equal, in fact, to the natural population frequency. In the latter case we 
have a method with a good chance of bringing this about; in the former 
we can do no better than to try to cook up samples with this feature. 
Presumably the motivation for my proposal by analogy with controlled 
experiments will do little to impress Eells. Eells, in common with anyone 
else who thinks that the unanimity condition provides an explication of 
the concept of probabilistic causation (p. 111), is committed to the pes- 
simistic position that a controlled experiment gives absolutely no infor- 
4Suppose no smokers exercise. We must then compare samples both of which contain 
no exercisers. There is no immediate problem since smoking and exercising cannot inter- 
act, though we would clearly want to investigate possibilities such as that smoking caused 
heart attacks by preventing exercising. 
As Eells obliquely suggests (p. 111, n. 3) my proposal has much in common with the 
theory of Giere (1984). One difference is that Giere, in discussing spurious correlations, 
suggests (pp. 293, 301) that we adjust the frequency of other factors in a control sample 
to match their frequencies in a test sample. My proposal is rather to match the frequency 
of other factors in the test sample to their frequency of occurrence in the general popu- 
lation. This seems preferable in principle because, at least in my view, we are ultimately 
interested in the impact of a factor on the population with its actual distribution of other 
factors. 
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mation about the causal propensities of a population.5 This is just because 
a controlled experiment tells us only about average effects. It tells us 
nothing about the various positive and perhaps negative effects that may 
contribute to that average. This strikes me as a disastrous divergence be- 
tween metaphysics and methodology, a general issue to which I shall 
return below. 
At any rate, Eells also offers a direct objection to my claim. He asks 
us to consider a situation in which the probability of suffering a heart 
attack depends on smoking and exercising in the following way: among 
exercisers, smokers are less prone to heart attacks than nonsmokers, whereas 
among nonexercisers the effect of smoking is reversed. Eells points out 
correctly (p. 110) that, according to my proposal, whether smoking causes 
or prevents heart attacks in such a situation will depend on the frequency 
of exercisers. I agree, but fail to see why anyone should be surprised by 
such a conclusion. Had we been blessed with a somewhat different bio- 
chemical constitution, smoking might have been a prophylactic against 
heart disease. I cannot see why our propensity to exercise should be less 
able than the details of our biochemistry to effect our causal susceptibil- 
ities. Thus I agree with Eells that we may be able to distinguish a sub- 
population in which smoking prevents heart attacks. I just do not see why 
this should be taken to contradict the claim that in the population as a 
whole, smoking may cause heart attacks. For Eells a contradiction does 
arise, since whenever a factor is positive for an effect in one subpopu- 
lation, and negative in another, it is said to be mixed, and thereby neither 
positive nor negative in the whole population.6 This maneuver is essential 
for the defense of the unanimity theory. However, unless we take una- 
nimity to be an intuitively necessary ingredient of probabilistic causality, 
a more pragmatically useful conception of relativization will allow that a 
cause be both positive for a population and negative for some subpopu- 
lation of it. (The example of the physiological condition under which 
smoking decreases the probability of lung cancer was intended to make 
just this possibility intuitively plausible.) Thus, to reiterate a point from 
my earlier paper, while it may often be very valuable to know that there 
is a subpopulation in which the causal influence of a factor is reversed, 
'We do learn, I suppose, that it is not the case that C causes not-E, and that there is 
some population in which C causes E, though with no clue as to what this population 
might be. This does not strike me as exciting news. 
6There is also something disturbingly arbitrary about the absolute distinction between a 
factor that reverses the direction of another causal factor, as in Eells's smoking and ex- 
ercising case, and one which merely moderates or increases the strength of another. If one 
is really serious about unanimity, it seems to me, one should restrict one's causal claims 
to the (presumably very small) populations in which a factor has an influence not only in 
the same direction, but also of a uniform strength. This would, of course, greatly increase 
the counterintuitive quality of the proposal. 
PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY 695 
I wish to argue that this constitutes a supplementation, not a refutation, 
of our causal claim about the larger population.7 
My answer to Eells's criticisms concerning the relativization of causal 
claims to particular populations should by now be fairly clear. As already 
admitted, my approach requires such relativization. A controlled exper- 
iment only gives reliable evidence about the causal properties of the pop- 
ulation from which the samples studied are drawn. And more generally, 
any theory that averages across different auxiliary causal factors will be 
sensitive to the particular distribution of such factors in particular pop- 
ulations. Thus I am certainly in agreement with Eells's view that prob- 
abilistic laws should be defined only over specified populations. Where 
I disagree, as should by now be clear, is just on how narrowly such pop- 
ulations must be defined. 
It is important to note that the extreme relativization required by the 
unanimity thesis presents overwhelming epistemological problems. If there 
are n factors causally relevant to the production of an effect, then una- 
nimity requires a positive or neutral effect in each of the 2n combinations 
of these factors. For many cases of interest it seems likely that 2n will 
exceed, or be of comparable magnitude to, the population in question. 
The human population, for example, certainly one of the largest we are 
likely to deal with in biology (and in most cases much too broad a cat- 
egory for generalizations concerning humans) is of the order of 231. It 
seems highly likely that the probability of heart attacks might be affected 
by as many as 31 factors. If so, then the average size of the causally 
homogeneous classes would be about one; many would be empty; and it 
would be quite impossible to determine whether the unanimity condition 
obtained. It might well turn out, for a causal factor with complex and 
variable interactions with other factors, that the population in which that 
factor was operative could only be specified by complete enumeration.8 
One's view of the preceding problem will turn, to some extent, on 
one's view of the nature of probability. It would be possible for someone 
who believed that probabilities were to be understood as limiting fre- 
quencies in theoretically infinite classes to maintain that the objections 
'Another reason for insisting on the legitimacy of averaging is that there may be causes 
that can have opposite effects in entirely homogeneous populations, so that to eschew 
averaging will leave one with no way whatever of constructing appropriate causal state- 
ments. This possibility, which I take to be a significant one, is discussed in detail elsewhere 
(Dupr6 and Cartwright 1988), so I shall not pursue it here. 
80f course, as implied above, it cannot be assumed that all these sets of conditions will 
actually be realized in a given population. In cases where they are not, the defender of 
unanimity could either declare the causal truth about the population epistemically inac- 
cessible, or decide that only exemplified sets of conditions mattered. The latter would have 
some paradoxical consequences. For example, it might turn out that the birth of a baby 
with a particular unique physical constitution would make it cease to be true that smoking 
caused lung cancer. Neither solution looks very encouraging for the unanimity theorist. 
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outlined above were "merely" practical. However, to defend the unanim- 
ity theory in this way would open up gaps between probability and prob- 
abilistic laws, and, again, between metaphysics and methodology, that 
seem to me intolerable. 
This leads me to a disagreement Eells expresses with another claim 
made in my earlier paper (and also implied in my discussion, above, of 
the possible relativity of the causal upshot of smoking to the population 
frequency of exercising). There I suggested that we should recognize the 
possibility-indeed likelihood-that the laws of nature might turn out to 
depend on contingent facts about the populations to which they applied. 
Eells's response to this suggestion seems very surprising. For he seems 
to concede that insofar as the laws in question apply only to specific 
populations my claim is true. But he then dismisses the suggestion as 
being true in only a "trivial sense" (p. 112), citing Hempel's (1965) dis- 
tinction between fundamental and derived laws, and asserting that my 
claim applies only to the latter. The implication is that laws referring to 
particular populations are necessarily merely derivative. But earlier in the 
paper, as I have mentioned, he states that "probabilistic causality is a 
relation between three things: a causal factor C, a probabilistic effect of 
it E, and a population within which C is a causal factor for E" (p. 107, 
original emphasis). And as he is at pains to emphasize, this is a claim 
about what probabilistic causality really is. Thus Eells's theory leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that all probabilistic laws are merely deriv- 
ative; or at least that there are no real probabilistic laws, as opposed to 
just probabilistic facts about particular populations. I could hardly have 
hoped for stronger support for my claim that the unanimity thesis is a 
kind of covert determinism. 
I imagine that most theorists of probabilistic causality, and perhaps 
even Eells, would not wish to conceive of all probabilistic laws as nec- 
essarily relativized to particular (token) populations. I take it that the laws 
of quantum mechanics, assuming that these are irreducibly probabilistic, 
are not generally conceived in this way. But Eells and I perhaps agree 
that the laws of biology, anthropology, economics, sociology, etc. must 
be so relativized. It appears that Eells wants to claim that these laws are 
all derivative, and therefore scarcely worthy of being denominated "laws" 
(compare Smart's (1963) claim about biological laws). But to claim that 
all the laws of these sciences are derivative is to embrace a very strong 
form of reductionism. That is an issue beyond the scope of this reply.9 
However, it is an underlying commitment that needs to be made explicit 
in this debate. 
This brings me to the last of the issues to which I wish to respond. 
9The kind of reductionism in question is discussed and criticized in Dupre (1983, 1988). 
PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY 697 
Contrary to Eells's suggestion, I was thinking primarily about meta- 
physical issues rather than methodological ones (though see note 2, above, 
for a possible source of confusion). My metaphysical view is, on the other 
hand, partly motivated by the epistemological prejudice mentioned above: 
that the clearest idea we have of when we are confronting a probabilistic 
law (at least at the macroscopic level), is when we have a good controlled 
experiment. I am inclined towards a metaphysical view of what we are 
then confronting that is sufficient to explain why a controlled experiment 
of a suitable kind should reveal it, but does not assume any more than 
is necessary for such an explanation. I suggest this principle can be gener- 
alized in a traditional empiricist spirit: our metaphysical views should 
never be stronger than is necessary to make sense of what we take our- 
selves to know, and how we suppose we have come to know it. 
This leads me to reiterate my most basic metaphysical disagreement 
with Eells and other proponents of unanimity theories: I see no reason to 
assume that there is any ultimate finest level of description for causal 
laws. The phenomena in which we are interested have many causes that 
we know of, and doubtless many that we don't. For all we know they 
may have infinitely many causes, though I do not propose to commit 
myself either way on that question. 
It is pretty clear that the unanimity theory grossly violates such a prin- 
ciple. It is, in fact, largely irrelevant to understanding actual methods of 
causal inquiry. It fails to explain the utility of controlled experiments. 
And, recalling the discussion above, for a population size of N, the con- 
cept of a complete partition among n factors will have no application 
unless N >> 21, a condition I see no reason to expect will generally be 
satisfied. As I mentioned, the pragmatic hopelessness of the unanimity 
theory does not preclude the possibility of defending it as a metaphysical 
thesis about causality; my point is just that perhaps it should. 
In fact, I am inclined precisely to reverse Eells's view about which 
issues are methodological and which are metaphysical. It seems to me 
that partitioning should be seen as a pragmatic response to the unavail- 
ability of a metaphysically justifiable approach. The correct way of un- 
derstanding partitioning, on this view, is not that one can thereby hope 
to achieve causally homogeneous samples-since we have no reason to 
suppose that there are such-but rather as the best methodology available 
for attempting to approximate the notion of afair sample10 when one is 
not in a position to work with random samples."1 One cannot use a ran- 
"0Strictly speaking, this requires additionally that the statistics from partitions be weighted 
according to their numerical size. 
"I do not, of course, contrary to the implication of Eells's discussion on pp. 112-113, 
deny that failure to consider an additional factor, whether in partitioning according to the 
unanimity theory or in constructing a fair sample, may lead to incorrect results. As Suppes 
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dom sample, because one is forced to resort to naturally occurring smok- 
ers rather than introducing smoking into a randomly selected sample of 
people. In this case the best we can do is to partition our data with respect 
to factors known or suspected to be causally relevant to the outcome in 
question, since we know that non-randomness in these respects will tend 
to distort our conclusions. How far it is reasonable to pursue such pre- 
cautionary measures is a difficult and important methodological issue, but 
not, I am arguing, an issue of fundamental metaphysical consequence. 
Picking up a familiar refrain from this debate, Eells concludes his paper 
by reiterating the thesis that "average effect is a sorry excuse for a causal 
concept". If so, perhaps it is God who owes us an apology. 
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